HOW MUCH?
HOW MUCH? "VALUE FOR MONEY" THE MOST EXPENSIVE RESTAURANT PER
CUSTOMER IN THE WORLD HOW CAN ULTRAVIOLET MAKE MONEY? IS THE INDIRECT MARKETING ROLE OF ULTRAVIOLET A NEW IDEA? JC CHIANG: VISIONARY CHAIRMAN
Now we are talking!
Well… we won't let you escape from less than 3,000 RMB/head. Set price for 20-course set menu including beverage pairing and out of extras / optional drink alternatives or special events. "Not less" is another way to say: it could be more…)
Have I heard "expensive"?
Sure, why not, probably one of the most expensive dining experiences in Shanghai…China…
But if you want to talk about bucks, you need to get the whole "value for money" picture*. After all, it is always a matter of value for money… set aside that the notion of value for money could be subjective, nothing worse than a cheap bad pizza.
Let me sum up the objective reasons why your money can't even buy Ultraviolet's values.
Did you ever think that those spectators buying a ticket for a F1 race where paying for those teams' expenses?
However expensive, the F1 ticket is to an extent a "sponsored" ticket (which, I agree does not necessarily give it much value for money…too noisy…terrible value noise ratio…)
A few trivial things you might need to understand is that Ultraviolet is a 1.8M RMB investment /capital (in other words 275,000$ or 200 000 Euros /guest), which sets the project as one of the most expensive restaurants per customer in the World.
Not even talking about the fact, that Ultraviolet holds one of the world's record ratios of employee per guest (2.5 staff/guest), crushing from far the ratio of nearly all of the 3 Michelin stars you've ever heard of.
All this to let you know that,
If Ultraviolet was only trying to break even, your seat could just cost 5,000 RMB! Yes, so we sponsor for over 100% of your "investment"!
Does the value for money notion apply there? Or shall we rather talk about value for pleasure, for time…
Some will like, some won't…of course we'll be judged…but let's not get trivial shall we?
You'd better like it.
It won't. As a strong marketing tool, and through strategic partnerships* with like-minded companies, Ultraviolet will be able to keep the customer's cost of a dinner at an average of 2000 RMB – less than the restaurant's actual cost.
An experimental project like Ultraviolet, cannot subscribe to the traditional model of direct revenue. Instead, Ultraviolet's image as innovative, daring, and unique restaurant reflects back on its partners and sponsors.
It functions very much within the almost-extinct definition of fine dining*: as an experience in developing an image, thus, indirect sources of revenue, for its owners, sponsors and partners.
Apart from this, Ultraviolet has been conceived as a Research & Development project to help develop technical partnerships and consulting roles within various fields of the food and beverage industry.
The almost-extinct definition of fine dining*
The expression "fine dining" has become a pejorative. Let's talk about its original meaning.
Fine dining has hardly ever been economically viable; they were called the "danseuse".
Their initial role was to develop a prestigious image for an owning company: a noble form of publicity that reflected on the company's reputation, and therefore its market shares and selling prices.
Ultimately, the "danseuse" return on investment was in generating genuine press clippings, a prestigious image with a superior power of conviction than offensive, self-laudable publicity.
But along the way, the indirect nature of fine dining's marketing role left restaurants to compete for pride, loosing sight of economic fundamentals.
What should fine dining restaurants stand for?
Image? ... Direct revenue? ... Both? ... Here we are: the milk, and the money from the milk.
By the end of the 20th century, "The fine dining danseuse" of the last century was forced to pursue direct revenue and compromise on wages, the number of seats, quality, and ambition, when not replaced by premium chef brands, themes, or other specialties restaurants.
"Fine dining" dinosaurs had forgotten so much about any marketing role, that they didn't realize that the lack of positive image could be translated in financial loss - failure could become an anti-marketing tool.
With a few exceptions, the image and term of "fine dining" went old-fashioned, standing for: "pretentious, average, politically correct, boring, mediocrity wrapped in silverware…"
In other words, "fine dining" ended "bad dining."
Now how about Ultraviolet?
Ultraviolet's small size protects the project from any uncontrolled loss.
It is a powerful P.R., marketing, and sales department of its own, representing not just itself, but a global project.
Through strategic partnerships, returns on communication and sponsorship by like-minded brands, Ultraviolet has been able to resuscitate this almost-extinct definition of fine dining, and applies it to a modern restaurant.
The danseuse is back, but she is rare, bold, beautiful and under control.
JC Chiang, Chairman, The Max Group, VOL group
www.orientalmax.com/eng/aboutmax.html
JC Chiang is the visionary man who founded in 1994 the Max Group, a leader within the global shoe industry.
Today, the Max Group is more than a dozen companies, comprised of over 8,000 people, making and selling more than 17 million premium quality, designer ladies footwear pairs of shoes every year.
From its headquarters in southern China, Max Group is at the leading edge of a new wave of companies that is looking forward to the next 20 years, aiming to build a global corporation with reach, scale and sustainability.
Well known for his quiet determination, passion and focus, JC set his "shoe" in the Food & Beverage industry in 2002, creating VOL group whose portfolio encompasses in Shanghai: Mr & Mrs Bund, Bar Rouge, and Artbeat Studio.
With the vision to build up a leading entertainment group and genuine concepts, JC was among the first to fully embrace the potential of development behind Ultraviolet, providing the team a strong and unconditional support.
